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The Case for a Literal Reading
of UCC Section 2-708(2)
(One Profit for the Reseller)
Morris G. Shanker*
The author seeks to demonstrate that a literal reading of Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-708(2), which would deny a second profit
to a reselling "lost-volume" seller, makes good commercial sense. Other
commentators have 'strained, tugged, or ignored" the language of section 2-708(2) in an effort to give a profit to this reselling seller. The
author suggests that, in doing so, these commentators: (1) have ignored
the clear and express language of not only section 2-708(2) but also sections 2-706 and 2-709(2); (2) have elevated section 2-708(2) to the role
of the aggrieved seller's "primary"remedy while the Code clearly intends
that section 2-706 serve as such; (3) may have practically eliminated the
mitigation-of-damagesprinciple from sales litigation;(4) have presented
extraordinarily difficult and perhaps insoluble practical litigation problems; and (5) have proposed a thesis which may be inconsistent with
what the business world expects. The author also suggests that the com-mentators'analysis may be faulty in that it assumes the existence of a
theoretical "buyers' market" which may not, in fact, exist in the real
business world.

I.

BACKGROUND -

THE CODE V. THE COMMENTATORS

SCHLOSSER'S COMMENT 1 again demonstrates the difficulties which he and other commentators have had in interpreting section 2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code' to give a

AR.

. THE AUTHOR: MoRRis G. SHANKER (B.S.E.E., Purdue University; M.B.A., J.D.,
University of Michigan) is a Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University and
has been a Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, University of California (Berkeley), Wayne State University, and the University of London, England. His
teaching specialties include Commercial Law, Creditors' Rights, and Property Security.
He is admitted to the Ohio Bar and, prior to entering full-time teaching, practiced
law in Cleveland, Ohio for 10 years.
Mr. Charles R. McDonald, a member of the Ohio Bar and former Editor of the
Case Western Reserve Law Review, assisted the author in preparing this Comment, particularly with the legal research. Professor Gerhard Rosegger of the Economics Department at Case Western Reserve University also spent many hours seeking to instruct the
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acknowledged.
1
Schlosser, Construing UCC Section 2-708(2) to Apply to the Lost-Volume Seller,
24 CASE W. RE& LAw REv. 686 (1973).
2 UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-708(2) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Throughout this Comment, unless otherwise designated, all references to statutory sections are
to sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-708(2) provides:
If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put
the seller in as good a position as performance would have done then the mea-
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profit plus reasonable overhead (usually referred to in this Comment as merely "profit") to the "lost-volume" seller who can resell
his goods elsewhere. Specifically, the problem arises because the
profit authorized by section 2-708(2) must under its literal language
be diminished by the amount of any "proceeds of resale." Where
finished goods are involved which can be resold at the original contract price, that credit typically will result in zero damages for the
reselling seller.3 Yet, Schlosser and the other commentators remain
convinced that the lost-volume seller is the very person for whom the
profit formula of section 2-708(2) was intended, notwithstanding
the fact that he is able to recover his full price at a later sale. Thus,
they labor mightily to conjure up solutions which will make section
2-708(2) fit him, and, in the process, have engaged in what has been
aptly noted as "a certain amount of stretching and tugging 4 at its
statutory language. Schlosser stretches the statutory word "profit"
to mean two profits; that is, a profit on the original sale and then a
second profit from the resale.5 Nordstrom tugs at the statutory
words "proceeds of resale," arguing that they apply only where partially completed goods as opposed to finished goods are involved.6
sure of damages is the profit (including reasonable overhead) which the seller
would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with any incidental damages provided in this Article (Section 2-710), due allowance for
costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.
3 But not invariably. The aggrieved seller may always collect incidental damages
from the breaching buyer, which, among other things, would include any costs incurred
in connection with the resale of the goods. UCC § 2-710. And, of course, if the parties
have agreed to a valid liquidated damages clause under UCC § 2-718(1), the amount
thereof may be collected. If there is no such liquidated damages clause and if the buyer
made a predelivery deposit, then that deposit could be retained by the aggrieved seller,
but only up to 20 percent of the price of $500, whichever is less. UCC § 2-718(2) (b).
4 Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2):
Economic Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 681, 693
(1972). It should be noted that Speidel and Clay were discussing damages available to
a seller where the buyer repudiates in the midst of production, whereas this Comment
deals only with the rights of reselling "lost-volume" sellers of finished goods. See note
6 infra.
5 Schlosser, supra note 1, at 692.
6 R. NoRDsRoM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 177, at 541 (1970). This
view was also recently accepted by the New York Court of Appeals in Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972). But, query,
why do these authorities distinguish between situations where the goods are finished and
those where they are not? According to the commentators, the real evil is that the seller
has "lost" a sale. Assuming that this aggrieved seller is a volume seller who produces
many lots of goods, why should he "lose" a profit from one lot simply because its expected buyer breached at a time when the goods were still in the process of being manufactured? If the commentators' thesis is correct, should not this seller have the right
authorized by UCC § 2-704(2) either to dispose of the goods as salvage or to complete
them for resale elsewhere and still collect his full original profit from the original
breaching buyer? Having merely raised this question, there will be no further discus-
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Harris,7 Hawkland, and White and Summers9 neither stretch nor
tug. Instead, their suggestion is that section 2-708(2)'s statutory
words "proceeds of resale" simply be ignored.
Obviously, none of the commentators' solutions appeal particularly to those lawyers and judges who have been trained to apply
statutory language rather than to stretch it, to tug at it, or to ignore
it. Indeed, the statutory construction problems which must be surmounted if the lost-volume seller who resells finished goods is to get
a profit from his original breaching buyer may be even greater than
the commentators have yet realized. In addition to section 2-708 (2),
whose literal language requires a full credit for the proceeds of any
resale, there are at least two other Code sections dealing with the
damage rights of reselling sellers that seem to require exactly the
same result; namely, section 2-706'0 and section 2-709(2).11

Sec-

tion 2-706 is of particular interest for several reasons. First, it is the
Code section drafted specifically to define the damage rights of aggrieved reselling sellers, and there is no suggestion within it that the
profit formula of section 2-708(2) is in any way intended to qualify
or be superior to it. Quite to the contrary, that profit formula is expressly stated to be a qualification only on the damage remedies set
out in section 2-708 (1), a section which is essentially concerned with
aggrieved sellers who do not resell or who resell improperly.' 2 Secondly, section 2-706 has been described by the Official Comments as
the aggrieved seller's "primary" remedy where a buyer refuses to accept the goods, 3 whereas section 2-708(2) has been described as
only his "residuary" remedy. 14 Thus, where the unqualified "primary" remedy (i.e., section 2-706) denies damages to an aggrieved
seller who can obtain his full price on a resale, that would seem to
sion of it. Rather, this Comment will be limited to the situation where the goods were
finished at the time of the buyer's breach and then were later resold.
7 Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REV. 66, 99 (1965).
8W.

HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES 153-54 (1958).

9

J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-13, at 235 (1972).

' 0 Nordstrom has also recognized that UCC § 2-706 reaches the same zero-damage
result which obtains under a literal reading of section 2-708(2). R. NORDSTROM, supra
note 6, § 177, at 541.
11 UCC § 2-709(2) authorizes aggrieved sellers who cannot readily resell their goods
to sue their breaching buyers for the price, but then makes clear that a full credit for
any resale proceeds must be allowed if and when resale becomes possible.
12 UCC § 2-704, Comment 1.
13

UCC § 2-706, Comment 2.

14 Schlosser, sukra note 1, at 688.
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pose a formidable interpretive hurdle to the commentators' arguments that this same reselling seller should somehow obtain a different and more favorable result' 5 through his "residuary" remedy
(i.e., section 2-708(2) ).
So the battle lines are drawn between the Code and the commentators. The three sections of the Commercial Code which expressly deal with the damage rights of an aggrieved seller who can
resell his finished goods elsewhere by their literal terms all reach exactly the same result which the commentators find so distressing;
namely, that no second profit is to be allowed an aggrieved seller of
finished goods if he can recover his full purchase price at a later
resale.' 6 Notwithstanding, the commentators continue to insist that
this cannot be so where there is involved a reselling seller who has
"lost" a sale. As such, they continue to stretch, to tug, and to ignore
section 2-708(2)'s language to achieve what they are sure must be
the "correct" result.
Is it just possible that the commentators are mistaken? Is it just
possible that the Code drafters intended that their literal words,
stated in three separate places, be accepted at face value, and that
an aggrieved seller who can resell his goods elsewhere should not
receive yet a second "profit" from his original breaching buyer?
Equally important, is it just possible that this may be the more sensible commercial result?
II.

A.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE
COMMENTATORS' VIEWS

The Effect on the Mitigation-of-DamagesPrinciple

If, as the commentators insist, section 2-708(2) was intended to
give an aggrieved lost-volume reselling seller another profit from his
original breaching buyer, then one ought to consider the consequences which may follow. Some, at least, might raise a few legal
eyebrows. One of those consequences may be that the mitigation of
damages principle, thought to be fully applicable to Commercial
Code matters, will actually have little function in sales contract liti15
Under the commentators' views, section 2-708(2) works out so favorably for the
reseller that White and Summers have tagged it as the "pearly gates through which lost
volume sellers may enter." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-11, at 229.
See also text accompanying note 28 infra.
16 To repeat, the three Code sections which reach this result are UCC § 2-706 (the
seller's so-called "primary" remedy), UCC § 2-708(2) (the seller's so-called "residuary"
remedy), and UCC § 2-709(2) (the seller's special price remedy when resale becomes
possible only at a time remote from the breach).
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gation. This is because most (although obviously not all) 17 sellers
operate, or, at least, claim to operate in "buyers' markets"; 1 8 that is,
situations where the seller has more goods to sell than he has customers to buy them. Thus, almost every seller will apparently qualify as the very lost-volume seller who the commentators insist is entitled to a profit under section 2-708 (2). As a result, any buyer contracting with such a seller will, upon refusal to accept delivery, necessarily owe damages measured by the seller's profit with apparently
no possibility of mitigation. 9
The full impact of this point can be illustrated by considering
the Boeing-TWA example used by White and Summers.20 In this
example, TWA breached its contract to purchase a 747 from Boeing. Boeing then delivered that very same plane to Pan Am, another of Boeing's customers, for the same price. 2' White and Summers argue that Boeing, even though it received the same price for
the same plane from Pan Am, nevertheless has still lost the profit
which it might have made on the original TWA sale. As such, they
urge that TWA must, because of section 2-708(2), pay to Boeing
damages measured by that lost profit. And, it is hard to see how any
mitigation of damages principle could ever come to TWA's rescue.
Under the commentators' views, TWA, having contracted with a
volume seller, is inexorably bound to pay at least the profit which
Boeing hoped to make, even though TWA never receiveed the plane
and even though Boeing received a full price for it on the resale.
Let us now change the facts slightly. Suppose that TWA, realizing that it can no longer use the 747 which it ordered from Boe17 White

and Summers point out that the car market immediately after World War

II was a "seller's" rather than a "buyer's" market. J.

WITE

& R. SUMMERS, supra

note 9, § 7-9, at 227. A similar situation seems to be developing today in several industries. See note 35 infra.
18 But see my criticism of this thesis at text accompanying notes 29-35 infra.
19Nordstrom has also recognized that "the volume seller does not mitigate his lost
profit when he makes a second sale - even of the same goods .... " R. NORDSTROM,
supra note 6, § 177, at 536.
20 J. WITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-13, at 234.
21 Did White and Summers use the right example to test out their thesis in hypothesizing a "resale" of the TWA plane to Pan Am who already was contractually committed
to buy a 747? Is such a transaction even a "resale" of the goods which section 2-708(2)
contemplates? Would not the correct example to test out section 2-708(2) be where the
"resale" was to a new customer who was not already contractually bound to buy a 747
plane when TWA breached? See Harris, A General Theory for Measuring Seller's
Damages for Total Breach of Contract, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 577, 599-601 (1962), which
seems to recognize that the question of whether a reselling seller is entitled to a profit
under section 2-708(2) becomes a critical issue only where a new customer is solicited
to buy the original goods. The United example, contained in the next paragraph of the
text, reflects this more proper situation for analyzing section 2-708(2).
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ing, convinces United to take that same plane off its hands for the
same price. Having done so, TWA then assigns its rights to receive
delivery of the 747 to United, a power which TWA would seem to
have under section 2-210(2). (Or, if TWA prefers, it could accomplish the same result by actually taking delivery of the plane
from Boeing and then immediately reselling it to United.) Under
these slightly changed facts, one suspects that most lawyers would
advise TWA that it has no further responsibility to and owes no
damages whatsoever to Boeing. Indeed, one suspects that any competent counsel would advise TWA to follow this course of action in
an effort to avoid paying to Boeing the "profit" which the commentators insist it is required to do. Yet, under the logic of the commentators' views, that advice might be faulty. The commentators might
well argue that since United can buy 747's only from Boeing and
since Boeing has plenty of 747's to sell, it must therefore follow that
TWA's actions have caused Boeing to "lose" the further sale and the
additional profit which it might have made from United. Thus,
even though TWA seems to have acted in good faith to mitigate the
damages (profit) for which it might be liable when it could not take
the plane, nonetheless, TWA's efforts have proved to be futile and
TWA must nevertheless still pay to Boeing its "lost" profit.
As has been previously suggested, it is quite possible that the
courts under these slightly changed facts might well rule that TWA,
having assigned its rights to United (or having taken delivery of the
completed plane and then having resold it to United), has no further
damage responsibility to Boeing. And, if that were the ruling of the
courts, then it would pose the following interesting dilemma for the
commentators to consider. If TWA can mitigate its liability for
damages by assigning (or reselling) to United its rights to receive
delivery of the plane, then why should not the result be the same
when Boeing resells? Indeed, why should not Boeing be under a
duty to do likewise; that is, to use reasonable efforts to find a buyer
(like United) and sell to it the plane originally intended for TWA?
Isn't such reasonable effort by an aggrieved seller to reduce even a
contract breacher's damages exactly what the mitigation principle
is supposed to require?
Any argument that the mitigation of damages principle should
not apply to these reselling situations seems considerably weakened
when one considers the results which obtain in a suit for the price
under section 2-709(1) (b). This Code section permits a seller (like
Boeing) to sue its buyer (TWA) for the price if the seller is unable
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by reasonable effort to resell the goods (the plane). However, if
during this suit, another person (like United) ever appeared who was
willing to buy that same plane from the seller (Boeing), then section 2-709(2) requires that the proceeds of that resale be credited
in favor of the buyer (TWA).22 Itwill be noted that the result
obtained in the section 2-709 suit is exactly the same as that which
is reached when the mitigation of damages principle is applied to
the section 2-708(2) profit formula.
And, this is exactly what
one would expect. Certainly, it is hard to believe that the Code
drafters intended different results simply because the aggrieved
seller resells his goods before bringing a price action rather than
after it. In either case, TWA (the original buyer) should be excused from further damages 2' just as soon as Boeing, the aggrieved
seller, finds another customer (like United) to take the original
goods (the 747) for the same price.
B. The Reversal of Roles of Section 2-708(2)
and Section 2-706
A second curious legal consequence which may flow from the
commentators' views of section 2-708(2) is the reduced role which
section 2-706 (and also section 2-709(2)) would hereafter play in
sales litigation. As mentioned earlier, these are the Code sections
expressly written to deal with a reselling seller's damages, and, indeed, section 2-706 has been described as that aggrieved seller's "primary"2 5 remedy whereas section 2-708 (2) has been described as but
his "residuary" remedy. 0 Yet, under the commentators' views, these
roles would likely be reversed. Section 2-708(2) would become the
aggrieved seller's primary remedy whereas section 2-706 (and section 2-709(2) ) would become his residuary remedies. This follows
again from the fact that most sellers claim to operate in "buyers'
markets"; that is, a situation where the seller has more goods to sell
than he has customers to buy them.
Thus, these sellers are the
22 If no buyer (like United) ever appears during the section 2-709 litigation, TWA
will have to pay Boeing the price but, at least, will then have the plane - typically
a more favorable situation for TWA than paying to Boeing a "profit" and having
nothing.
23 As mentioned earlier, this result, requiring mitigation, seems mandated by the lit-

eral language of section 2-708(2). See text accompanying notes 3-9 supra.
24
Other than damages mentioned in note 2 supra.
25
See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
2
6See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
27 But see my criticism of this thesis later at text accompanying notes 29-35 infra.
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very lost-volume sellers with whom the commentators are so concerned and who they claim are entitled to the profit formula of section 2-708(2). Therefore, upon breach by their buyers, these lostvolume sellers will surely claim (and if the commentators are correct, will be allowed) the profit remedy set out in section 2-708(2)
rather than the damage remedies of section 2-706 or section
2-709(2). These claims will be made for the obvious reason that
the seller could then keep both the full proceeds of any resale of the
goods and, as well, get an additional profit from the original breaching buyer. It is undoubtedly for this very reason that White and
Summers have described section 2-708(2) as the "pearly gates"
through which lost-volume sellers may enter."' Thus, in damages
litigation involving reselling sellers, the Code sections written primarily to deal with their problem (i.e., section 2-706 and section 2709(2) ) would have little function whereas the "residuary" section
(i.e., section 2-708(2) ) would assume the primary role, and this
seems a curious twist from what the Code drafters apparently intended.
III.

THEORY AND THE REAL BUSINESS WORLD

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that allowing a reselling seller another profit under section 2-708 (2) cause two problems:
(1) it poses formidable problems in statutory interpretation, and
(2) it gives rise to consequences that seem to raise legal eyebrows.
But, what about the merits of the commentators' arguments? Are
they correct in urging that the lost-volume seller who can resell his
goods should nevertheless get his "lost profit" from the original
breaching buyer? In the theoretical world which the commentators
have postulated, perhaps their analysis is correct. But, lawsuits are
concerned with actual rather than theoretical situations. And, in
the more practical arena of real-life litigation, a rule denying profits
to a reselling seller will surely prove to be more workable. Indeed,
it may even prove to be more just.
The error of the commentators' analysis may be that it is based
on the erroneous assumption that sellers operate in some theoretically perfect "buyers' market"; that is, a situation where it can be
shown that the seller has and will in the future have (1) only a predictable and finite number of customers, 29 and (2) an unlimited ca2

8J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-11, at 229.
29 White and Summers, in particular, make this assumption in their Boeing-TWA
example when they postulate "that Boeing has contract[s] for the sale of [exactly) 100
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pacity continually to sell to all new buyers that may appear on the
scene. ° Under these assumptions, it is true that every buyer who
reneges on a sales contract theoretically has deprived his seller of a
sale and a profit.
However, it is unlikely that any individual seller in the real business world fits into this theoretical model. Few, if any, could prove
with any certainty the specific number of customers they will have in
the future, and probably none ever have the unlimited capacity to
sell to all those who may appear. Rather, where a dynamic and viable business is involved, there are invariably going to be future
periods of time when the seller's situation is such that he simply cannot handle new customers. This may be due to such things as temporary shortages of goods, limitations on or breakdowns of productive
capacity, shortage of warehousing facilities, temporary unavailability of personnel, and so forth. Further, there are certain fundamental economic laws which dictate that sellers will not service any significant numbers of new customers, simply because it becomes unprofitable to do so. In particular, the economic law of diminishing
returns or increasing marginal costs states that as a seller's volume
increases, then a point will inevitably be reached where the cost of
selling each'additional item diminishes the incremental return to the
seller and eventually makes it entirely unprofitable to conclude the
next sale. Indeed, sellers must operate at or near the point of zero
incremental return if they are to be at their most profitable and competitive level.3 It is thus obvious that efficient and competitive sellers - probably the only ones who exist or can long survive in the
74 7's during the coming year." J. WITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-13, at
233-34.
30 See, e.g., Schlosser, supra note 1, at 687, which states: "The lost-volume seller is
an 'expansible' seller, one who can manufacture (or obtain) as many units as he has
buyers." See also W. HAWKLAND, supra note 8, at 153-54, which states: "If the dealer
has an inexhaustible supply of cars, the resale to replace the breaching buyer costs the
dealer a sale [and] Section 2-708(2) recognizes this ...." (emphasis added); R. NoRDSTROM,supra note 6, § 177, at 536, which assumes "volume sellers who have a sulcient
supply of goods available to them so that they could make as many sales as they are likely to obtain buyers." (emphasis added); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1100, at 541
(1964), which states: "If the seller is a manufacturer or producer of the subject of the
sale, with capacity to produce enough such articles to supply all probable customers, the
buyer's rejection does not make possible a second sale that the seller could not otherwise
have made." (emphasis added). Corbin is quoted with approval by Schlosser, supra
note 1, 686-87, and Harris, supra note 21, at 581.

31 There is much written on the economic law of diminishing returns or increasing
See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THEORY OF PRICE ch. 7 (3d ed. 1966). [ED.
NOTE: For a general discussion of the economic theory applicable to the lost-volume
marginal costs.

seller see A TheoreticalPostscript: Microeconomics and the Lost-Voluae Seller, 24 CASE
W. RES. L REV. 712 (1973).]
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business world - actually have little or no present capacity to serve
additional new customers, and, as such, hardly fit the hypothetical
model postulated by the commentators of sellers with unlimited capacity to serve new customers.
For the kinds of reasons just stated, sellers invariably run into
tight periods during which they cannot or will not handle additional
customers. Thus, any goods still remaining 2 from an earlier "lost
sale" make possible during these tight periods an "additional" sale
which the seller otherwise could not make. Thus, on balance, the
"lost sale" of yesterday is cancelled out by the "additional" sale
made possible during the later tight period.
To illustrate this point, assume that Seller has a roadside stand at
which he sells containers of "Crystal Lake Water." Customers place
their orders for a container of the water at the roadside stand, following which Seller sends his employee, Helper, to Lake Crystal to
fetch it. At first blush, this hypothetical illustration appears to be
the perfect "buyers' market" regarding which the commentators
have based their analyses: there is an apparently inexhaustible supply of water in Lake Crystal which Seller can sell to any and all customers who appear at his stand.
However, a more careful look at the situation shows that this
superficial analysis is faulty. As in any business, there are real constraints on Seller's future ability to sell buckets of Crystal Lake Water to all who may want them. In our illustration, that constraint is
Helper. Thus, if Helper can make only 10 trips per day to and
from Lake Crystal, then Seller can serve no more than 10 customers
per day. Of course, Seller will think he is in the perfect "buyers'
market" so long as his experience is that no more than seven customers per day appear at the roadside stand. 3 He then would argue
(adopting the commentators' views) that if Customer One on Monday refused to accept delivery of a container of water which he had
32 Dealing with perishable items which cannot "remain" presents unique problems
which are beyond the scope of this discussion. If, however, such perishables can be resold for the full purchase price, then the Commercial Code sections discussed in this
paper would seem to excuse the breaching buyer from further damages.
33 Obviously, this is a hypothetical case which probably could not take place in the
real world of competition. This is because Seller must allocate Helper's entire salary
among only seven daily sales, even though Helper is capable of making 10 trips. As
such, Seller could soon be driven out of business by a competitor who could easily sell
the same water at a lower price by hiring only a part-time helper, so that there was less
salary to allocate over the typical seven sales per day. Putting it another way, the seller
in the hypothetical seven-sale per day case mentioned in the text seems not to be at his
point of zero incremental return and, as can be seen, is not very competitive. See text
accompanying note 31 supra.
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ordered, then Seller has lost that sale and its corresponding profit.
This analysis would be flawless if Seller never experienced Tight
Tuesday. But, suppose on Tight Tuesday 11 customers happened to
place orders at the stand for water. Seller would then simply have
no way to handle that lth customer.-4 Or suppose that the usual
seven customers appear on Tight Tuesday, but Helper, due to illness
or a rainstorm, cannot work that day. Again, Seller cannot handle
the situation. Thus, whenever Tight Tuesday arrives, the containers
of water left over from Customer One's Monday breach make it possible for Seller to conclude an additional sale on Tuesday. As a result, in the total relevant period, Seller's apparent "loss" of the
Monday sale is readily made up.
And, in the real business world, these Tight Tuesdays do in fact
come. Production facilities break down, employees get sick, supplies
become temporarily unavailable, there is an unusual influx of new
customer orders, and so forth. By reason of such occurrences, it
would appear that the basic assumption of a perfect "buyers' market" which the commentators have relied upon to reach their conclusions simply may not be applicable to the mass of sellers in the real
business world. 5
IV.

A.

PRACTICAL LITIGATION PROBLEMS

Speculative Nature of the Evidence

Professor Harris, at least, has recognized that not all sellers can
qualify as lost-volume sellers. He sought to grapple with the problem by suggesting that three conditions must be proven to coexist
before a reseller may qualify for the profit set out in section 2708(2); namely, (1) the person who bought the resold goods would
3
4 Unless and until Seller hired a second helper. Of course, it may not be economically profitable for Seller to do so. See note 31 text accompanying supra. Even if it
were, Seller might well have trouble finding a second helper on short or no notice.
35 For a graphic illustration of this that involved an entire industry, consider the recent situation in the oil industry. In 1972 the commentators undoubtedly would have
insisted that oil suppliers were volume sellers dealing in "buyers' markets" and, therefore, entitled to the profit formula set out in section 2-708(2). However, by 1973,
that situation had completely reversed for the entire industry. Production of oil products was no longer capable of meeting the demand for them. See, e.g., Dale, Oil Shortage - The Economy's New Puzzle, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1973, § 3, at 1. How wrong
a court would have been in 1972 to allow a "profit" in favor of an oil company, since by
1973, any oil which a breaching buyer refused to take from it just a few months earlier
would make possible an "additional" sale in 1973. A similar situation may also now be
developing in other industries, including grain, chemical fertilizer, vitreous china, and
paper. See Harvey, Why Has the Land of Plenty Become Land of Shortages?, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 21, 1973, § AA, at 5 (Los Angeles Times/Washington Post
Service).
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have been solicited by the seller had there been no breach and resale; (2) the solicitation would have been successful; and (3) the
plaintiff could have performed the original contract."6 Curiously,
Professor Harris omits what would seem to be a necessary fourth
condition; namely, that the seller is able and willing to sell to all
new customers who want his goods in the future.37 But, no matter
how many conditions may be required to qualify the seller for the
profit formula of section 2-708(2), it should be noted that they require proof in court not of what actually happened, but rather, of
what might have happened. They are inquiries into the unknown
and into the speculative. Pragmatic plaintiff's lawyers are fully
aware of how difficult it is even to find objective admissible evidence of such matters, let alone to find enough of such evidence
to carry the burden of proof required of them. But, the real and
perhaps impossible challenge rests upon the judge (or other factfinder), for he must somehow decide whether the plaintiff has, in
fact, "proved" what is really unknowable. Do we really want to
develop rules of law that require such prescience from our courts?
After all, our courts are administered by human beings, not prophets.
B.

The Uncertainty of Profit and Overhead

The problems raised by requiring proof of speculative matters
are not the only practical difficulties which the litigation under the
commentators' views would engender. Even if the seller somehow
could prove he is within the theoretical "buyers' market" which the
commentators simply have postulated (but unfortunately have never
seriously verified), he must still go on to prove the measure of his
lost "profit (including reasonable overhead)." On this point, the
commentators fully concede that their view poses what may well be
an insoluble litigation problem. As White and Summers have stated:
"This phrase is likely to be the scene of bloody battles between the
accountants of the various parties. One can expect no unanimity
among accountants about what is overhead and what is not or about
how the overhead is to be allocated to the seller's various contracts. ' 3 8 Similarly, Schlosser, citing Speidel and Clay, also ac36 Harris, supra note 7, at 82. White and Summers approve the Harris approach.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-13, at 235.
37 See note 30 supra and accompanying text for examples of where the commentators have recognized the need for a limitless supply of goods which the seller can sell to
all comers.
38 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-13, at 235.
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knowledges "there is much debate over the exact measurement of
'profit' and 'overhead'...."9 The commentators candidly admit
that they "can give no assistance with [these] highly practical problems."" ° Nonetheless, they strongly urge a construction for section
2-708(2) which requires the courts somehow to resolve them.41 Exactly why do the learned commentators assume that the human lawyers and human judges should be able to solve highly practical litigation questions regarding which they can offer no guidelines whatsoever? And, if the courts should attempt to resolve this profit
dilemma, one ought to consider just what will be the end result for
the commercial world, as each set of judges and litigants in each individual case comes up with its own unique and ad hoc solutions.
That end result may be forecast: on this profit question, where the
money stakes are often quite high, there will develop a body of case
law which is neither uniform nor predictable. One suspects that
practical businessmen and the lawyers who represent them are not
likely to consider such unpredictable, inconsistent, and nonuniform
law to be the kind of "justice" which they wish to govern their com42
mercial affairs.
The commentators seem driven by a quest for achieving justice
in some abstract and theoretical sense. But theoretical justice in the
abstract may not always be justice in practical litigation. There
seems to be little commercial sense to strain at the language of section 2-708(2) in an effort (1) to make it cover theoretical situations
(i.e., a "buyers' market") which probably do not exist in the real
world and (2) to require the proof of a profit and overhead, the
39

40

Schlosser, supra note 1, at 689.

J.WHTE & R. SUMmES, supra note 9, § 7-13, at 235.
41 Indeed, White and Summers announce that they are "await[ing] with anticipation the case ... which will give us some insight into how the courts should and will
resolve disputes between the parties over the definitions of profit, overhead, due credit,
etc." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 9, § 7-13, at 237-38.
42
Men of commerce invariably have disdained unpredictable and inconsistent legal
solutions to their affairs. Wimess the following which was stated at another time, when
the commercial world was again arguing for "'a dear statutory basis' . . . in 'lieu of a
crazy quilt of contradictory judicial statements."' The event was the proposal in the
late 1930's to add present section 70(d) to the Bankruptcy Act. It was pointed out that
under the then existing judicial decisions "'no consistent theory of protected transactions [had] been developed,' and the situation was 'conducive to confusion and uncertainty, with potentialities for argument, "bluffing," litigation, expense and delay.' The
law consisted essentially of nebulous vagarities.'" (These quotations are taken from
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99,
106-07 (1966) (footuotes omitted), where he collected quotations from several leading
commercial authorities of the time.) While these words were said in dealing with a
different commercial question than that discussed in this paper, they give insight on
how the commercial world reacts to inconsistent and unpredictable judicial decisions.
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standard for which none can agree upon. In other places the Commercial Code drafters were quite willing to use workable rules in
place of those that might theoretically be more correct for the express reason of avoiding the practical litigation difficulties which the
theoretical rule fostered. One such example is section 9-306(4) (d)
(ii) which substitutes a workable 10-day rule for tracing proceeds of
security interests into comingled funds for the theoretically correct
(but practically difficult to administer) rule requiring a perfect tracing of those proceeds. 43 Yet another example is section 2-702. The
theoretically perfect legal rule permits a defrauded seller to reclaim
his goods at any time from his credit buyer. But proving fraud has
historically raised immense practical problems and provided highly
unpredictable and nonuniform results. Thus, in place of the historical and theoretically perfect fraud rule, the Code has substituted a
more workable litigation rule permitting any seller to reclaim goods
for 10 days so long as they were delivered while the buyer was
insolvent.
Conceivably, the Code drafters were using a similar approach in
writing section 2-708(2). If, in fact, the seller recovers by resale
elsewhere the full price (including one profit) for his finished goods,
is it not appropriate for the Code to decree that this is the end of
that seller's remedies; and that the law simply will not permit that
same seller to seek yet a second profit by instituting litigation which
will necessarily involve attempts to prove - often with speculative
evidence - (1) the existence of a highly unlikely situation (i.e., the
perfect "buyers' market") and (2) a standard (i.e., profit plus reasonable overhead) regarding which there is no agreement?
Such an approach would make good statutory drafting sense.
And, the approach becomes even more appealing if the practical
statutory rule developed which denies a second profit is roughly in
accord with the business world's expectations. This point seems not
even to have been considered by the commentators, but, indeed, it is
a crucial question. Does the business world really expect the second profit which the commentators claim is theirs under section
2-708(2) ? Or, is it more likely that most sellers who can recover
their full price by reselling their goods elsewhere essentially feel
43 One of the practical problems brought about by the tracing rule arises from differences of opinion between accountants as to how one traces money deposited in accounts
from which there have been subsequent withdrawals; that is, should one use a first-infirst-out rule to trace the proceeds, a last-in-first-out rule, etc.? How similar this seems
to be to the accountants' differences on how to define "profit" and "overhead."
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that they have been made whole? To illustrate this point, consider
the following scenario involving Sam Seller and his wife:
SAM SELLER: Honey, I had a terrible day at the store - full
of aggravation. Ben, that no-good welcher, signed up to buy
goods from me and, when I was ready to deliver, he reneged.
WIFE: That Ben is really no good - a first-class chiseler!
SAM: Yeah, but things didn't turn out too bad. When Ben
reneged, I called Charley and got him to take the same goods off
my hands for the same price I quoted to Ben. So, maybe Ben gave
me lots of aggravation, but, at least, I'm getting my money out of
the goods and not getting stuck with them.
WIFE: You sure were lucky to find Charley to buy those goods.
Bringing a lawsuit against Ben to collect your money would have
been lots of trouble and even more aggravation. Thank your lucky
stars it is all over.

As the above scenario is written, it certainly suggests that a businessman who can resell his goods elsewhere has no strong feeling or
expectation that he is entitled to get yet more from his original
buyer. And, if, in fact, this represents the typical scenario in the
business world, then has not justice essentially been accomplished?

Obviously, the commentators think not. As they view it, the Code
drafters intended that the scenario not end as above, but, rather, that
the following lines also be added to it.
WIFE: Sam, how much profit do you make
SAM: Who knows? Maybe 15 20 -

on those goods?
30 percent. It depends which bookkeeper is figuring out the overhead.
WIFE: Do you think that Charley would have bought those
goods from you anyway?
SAM: What kind of question is that? Sometimes Charley buys
from me and sometimes he buy from others.
WIFE: Do you keep lots of those goods in stock, so that you
can sell them all the time?
SAM: Do you think I'm a machine? How can I sell those
goods every single day of the year? Sometimes I run out, sometimes my stock boy doesn't show up for work to fill orders, sometimes I'm home sick.
WIFE: Sam, our son, the law professor, told me that if some
bookkeeper would say what is your profit and overhead on those
goods, and if Charley would say that he would have bought the
goods from you anyway, and if you will say that you have lots of
those same goods for sale, then you can still sue that no-good
welcher, Ben, for another profit.
SAM: Really! (Pause.)
Honey, what's our lawyer's phone
number?

